This article explores the rhetorical underpinning of the pedagogics of unlearning by way of a consideration of three figures: first, "the ignorant schoolmaster" as constructed by Jacques Rancière in The Ignorant Schoolmaster; second, "the intimate schoolmaster," as fantasized and feared by a diverse range of theories and theorists (but attention will specifically go to this figure as he features in a key moment of poststructuralism, namely Derrida's Dissemination); and third, "the ignorant sifu," as a figure that exemplifies a strong impulse in many modern movements in approaches to martial arts, self-defense, and combat training. I represent these three figures by way Joseph Jacotot, Plato/Socrates, and Bruce Lee, using them as a way to explore an undecidability at the heart of the binary ignorance/knowledge. Ignorance, I maintain, has always been a key (even if unacknowledged) premise of the dominant textual and discourse approaches of poststructuralism, and there are good reasons why we might try to unlearn some of our dominant understandings of or assumptions about the political and cultural importance of pedagogy.
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and for hegemonies of all kinds. No doubt we all have certain axes to grind and certain horses that we back. Hence we do or don't want creationism or evolution to be taught in schools, and we do or don't want multiculturalism championed or denounced, and we do or don't want the learning of facts by rote, and we do or don't want free critical thinking to be encouraged, and so on.
So far, so paternalistic. However, the real problem for academics seems to arrive when all of this baggage arrives outside our own door-specifically, the departmental doors of our own university. When we perceive hegemonies working (or trying to work) on us and feel the forces of dictates other than those of our own axes and our own horses, it strikes us as outrageous, and we come over all Kantian: the university should be free, we say. We denounce either the politicization or the depoliticization of the university, and we want to change it or halt it, even though, in a sense, we are merely experiencing what we say we already knew: the fact that educational institutions are key locations in any kind of hegemonic bloc or formation. It's only that we feel we should be exempt-because we are the philosophers, not the poor or the uneducated or the children. Or, if we can't be exempt, if we have to be included, we dislike this because this is not the hegemony we would prefer. If it were the hegemony we wanted, then we'd think we were free. But it's not, and we don't like it, so we say it's a "crisis" and we want to police the crisis or ward off the crisis, perhaps through the magical alchemy of polemic and critique. unlearning emancipation But maybe things have already gone too far. Or maybe it's just that I have already gone too far. Maybe my translation of the title "the pedagogics of unlearning" need only be rephrased as a question, perhaps like this: how do we rid ourselves of the instituted delusions of what Jacques Rancière once called the "explicative order" and rid ourselves of all of the deleterious consequences of various kinds of pedagogy, from the stultification of individual souls to the generalized maintenance of inequality? 2 This is a Rancièrean question, of course, or at least a question that I have forged using some of the terms that Rancière uses in The Ignorant Schoolmaster. Furthermore, my translation-interpretation of the conference title and my account of general field of problematics it seemed to be engaging is clearly Rancièrean too. I took a Rancièrean approach in unpacking the conference theme because I recognized in the awkward phrase of the title the presence and effects of a reading of Rancière's book The Ignorant Schoolmaster. Plus, I found out that Professor Rancière was to be the closing keynote speaker. So I put two and two together, ignored all the other prompts in what the organizers called the "irrationale" of the conference (for instance, the conference rationale, or "irrationale," also enjoined us to think about "the pedagogics of unlearning" in Lacanian or Derridean terms), and came up with my present translation-interpretation.
So, regarding my Rancièrean question about whether we can rid ourselves of stultification and inequality by education, the short (Rancièrean) answer would be no: no, we can't get rid of these things, we can't rid ourselves of stultifying pedagogy, and we certainly can't eradicate inequality. Not en masse. Not institutionally. Not through policy. As Rancière writes at the start of Education, Truth, Emancipation:
There is no social emancipation, and no emancipatory school. Jacotot [the radical educational innovator that is the focus of The Ignorant Schoolmaster] strictly distinguishes the method of emancipation, which is the method of individuals, from the social method of explanation. Society is a mechanism ruled by the momentum of unequal bodies, by the game of compensated inequalities. Equality can only be introduced therein at the price of inequality, by transforming equality into its opposite. Only individuals can be emancipated. And all emancipation can promise is to teach people to be equal in a society ruled by inequality and by the institutions that "explain" such inequality. (2010, 9) Only individuals can be emancipated, argues Rancière. But you can't institute this. You can't bottle it. You can't standardize it. It demands both an intimacy (that no social planning or policy or instituting can guarantee) and-if schooling is needed-you need an ignorant schoolmaster. What is an ignorant schoolmaster? Rancière is not coy about this: "The ignorant schoolmaster-that is to say one who is ignorant of inequalityaddresses him or herself to the ignorant person not from the point of view of the person's ignorance but of the person's knowledge; the one who is supposedly ignorant in fact already understands innumerable things" (2010, 5) . In proposing the need for an ignorant schoolmaster, Rancière constructs an intimate rhetorico-pedagogical relation and an egalitarian one. Emancipatory pedagogy involves a mode of rhetorical address that proceeds on the basis of an assumed equality. It says: if you don't know, paul bowman 554 work it out; you know how to work things out, so, try. The pedagogue's job is to address the other in such a way as to say, come on, work it out, I want you to solve this riddle, and I intend to verify that you have done it. Famously, Rancière argues that the emancipatory relation still involves will dominating will. We do not all become laissez-faire hippies. But, crucially, the pedagogical relation is not to be perceived as one of knowledge versus ignorance or intelligence versus stupidity. These interpretations of the pedagogical scene are, in Rancière's terms, stultifying. As he writes: Jacotot did not see what kind of liberty for the people could result from the dutifulness of their instructors. On the contrary, he sensed in all this a new form of stultification. Whoever teaches without emancipating stultifies. And whoever emancipates doesn't have to worry about what the emancipated person learns. He will learn what he wants, nothing maybe. He will know he can learn because the same intelligence is at work in all the productions of the human mind, and a man can always understand another man's words. (1991, 18) Now, it deserves to be mentioned that this is not just an aside. Rather, this argument has a central place in Rancière's work. This means that considerations of rhetoric and address have a central place in Rancière's work. That "a man can always understand another man's words" is arguably a premise central to all of Rancière's political thinking (Rancière 1999) . And nowadays, people ("Rancièreans") feel confident making this argument.
But rather than dwelling on this point, I would like to note that in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière immediately follows this account of Jacotot's perspective on teaching with a quick anecdote: "Jacotot's printer had a retarded son. They had despaired of making something of him. Jacotot taught him Hebrew. Later the child became an excellent lithographer. It goes without saying that he never used the Hebrew for anything-except to know what more gifted and learned minds never knew: it wasn't Hebrew" (1991, 18) . This is a very provocative passage. It is also problematic. It is in a way central to what I want to think about in this article. However, before I move on to that, I have to add, first, that in order to think about all of this in terms of "the pedagogics of unlearning" we need to remember two things about The Ignorant Schoolmaster.
The first is that Joseph Jacotot was already a popular teacher before he "discovered" anything about pedagogy. The second is that what he discovered or realized is that you can teach people stuff that you don't know and/or, on the other hand, that you can learn without being taught. So, when Jacotot taught the son Hebrew, what most likely happened was that he told the son to go off and learn Hebrew. Or maybe he even supervised him-in the sense of making sure that he was studying rather than checking what he was doing while he was studying. Because, remember, Jacotot wasn't teaching in the sense of imparting or communicating knowledge. He was merely encouraging, inspiring, or insisting that study take place, without policing the method or the result.
Of course, the fact that the boy studied Hebrew but never really learned Hebrew yet nevertheless learned something, so much so that it may have helped him to go on to become a lithographer (if there is actually a connection here), is deeply interesting. Artists and educators of all sorts have been inspired by this kind of story. It seems extremely upbeat and enabling. But something bothers me about it. It is the fact that Rancière allows the son to know that he does not know Hebrew. What bothers me about this is that Rancière thereby maintains a stability in the relation between knowledge and ignorance. The son knows that what he has learned when studying Hebrew was not Hebrew. 3 This allows Rancière to convey very clearly-as if with a wink and a wry smile-his polemical lesson about pedagogy. Study stuff; you'll learn stuff; it might not be what it says on the tin, but it's still stuff, and it'll do you good. Yet, in both its implicit affirmation of the production of "other knowledge" and of the emancipation of the son through his learning of the fact that he can learn, as an equal, the story eliminates an important element of undecidability. It keeps ignorance and knowledge in their proper place. No one in the story knows Hebrew, but the son gains an emancipating sense of self-worth and distinction from the knowledge that other people don't know what he does know, which is that he doesn't know Hebrew.
It is this dimension of a clear distinction between-or indeed partition or distribution of-knowledge and ignorance that interests me. This is because there are myriad contexts everywhere in the world, in life, in different practices and discourses, where such a differentiation between ignorance and knowledge seems impossible. Moreover, the interminable undecidability of ignorance and learning in most places seems hugely functional. This is what every theory of "discourse" is enabled by. It is certainly what subtends postmodern/Lyotardian theories of the " legitimation crisis in knowledge." It is, in other words, something of a fact of life. In light of this fact of life, in what follows I want to consider a few more contexts that might help us to interrogate the terms of our most common discourses of and on pedagogy and its rhetorics. However, I won't take any of my examples from the realms of either the school or the university. This is because I think to do so would allow us to indulge in a certain type of poststructuralist fantasy about the characteristics the ideal-typical pedagogical scene, a fantasy that emerged in the tradition of poststructuralism that was in a sense instituted and organized by the approaches of Derrida and de Man. This scene is neither "arboreal" nor "rhizomatic" nor virtual nor mediated; rather, it is basically a fantasy about a really great literature seminar. We see this fantasy rear its head time and again in poststructuralist discussions of teaching and learning.
I want to stay as far away from this logocentric classroom image as possible because, for one, too much poststructuralist thinking and writing about learning still seems based on at best an overvaluation of and at worst a "repressive hypothesis" involving modernist literature. As Rey Chow observes in The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism, even in the early work of Foucault-and I am proposing that this likewise dogs a great deal of literary deconstruction-the attitude is that the evil instrumental rationality of the world has really got it in for the heroic minority still invested in the saintly endeavor of reading really difficult literature.
If we think about pedagogical scenes and relations that differ from the "wordy," "logophiliac" or indeed "logocentric" preoccupations that tend to be preferred by poststructuralist thinking about pedagogy, if we broaden our frames-or even invert and displace them-in order to think about pedagogical scenes and relations that are rather far removed from the school or university classroom, it would seem reasonable (surely, even overdetermined) to include practices of the body. intimate lee I have argued before that an excellent case to consider when thinking about teaching and learning in terms of Rancière's arguments about emancipation and stultification is none other than Bruce Lee. As I first argued in a piece I wrote for Michael O'Rourke and Sam Chambers in their Borderlands journal issue "Jacques Rancière on the Shores of Queer Theory," Bruce Lee's approach to teaching martial arts was very Jacototian (Bowman 2009 ).
Moreover, and more importantly, he was not alone. But he also blazed a trail. And this seems important: to borrow and mangle a phrase, this was a train that others followed without following.
Bruce Lee was very much an autodidact; he was iconoclastic, hands-on, inventive, verificationist. He was also the author of a massively influential magazine article called "Liberate Yourself from Classical Karate" (1971), which argues (in effect) that most martial arts pedagogy insists on, produces, and intensifies deference, reverence, and conformity, via the institution of hierarchies and hence feelings of inferiority and inequality. Martial arts pedagogy produces robots, he argues. It stultifies. And it does so because true insight into what he calls the truth and reality of combat cannot and should not be institutionalized in the ways it has been. Think of classes of white-uniform-clad students standing in rows performing rote drills of kicks, punches, and blocks on the shouted commands of the instructor. As a counterimage to this, Lee fantasizes the figure of the founder of a martial art. He characterizes this figure as fluid and dynamic, as able to move freely and honestly express himself. The problem comes, he argues, when this figure's followers try to capture the essence of the genius and insight of the master or, indeed, when he or anyone else tries to formalize it. It is at this point of formalization that everything goes wrong. The genius is lost in the very effort to preserve it. This is because the genius of any martial art could be said to lie not in the accumulation of its techniques but rather in the ability to actualize its metaprinciple in a potentially infinite array of singular circumstances. In other words, to go beyond Bruce Lee's thought, for a moment, the genius is lost in the attempt to formalize it because there is no master. 4 Nevertheless, Lee clearly identified with precisely such a founder figure. This would certainly explain his ambivalence vis-à-vis what he himself had been teaching to his students during the final years of his tragically short life. For a long time he had merely taught what he called "Jun Fan kung fu"-and, given that Jun Fan was one version of his name, this did not signify a style as such. It just meant "Bruce Lee's kung fu." However, in 1968 Lee became enamored of the combination of the Cantonese terms for "stop" or "interrupt" (which in Cantonese is "jeet)" and "hit" (which in Cantonese is "kune") Believing that the highest aspiration in all martial arts is to block and strike simultaneously-to interrupt another's attack (jeet) and to hit (kune) simultaneously, beginning in 1968 Lee termed his "style" jeet kune do. As a name, jeet kune do referred solely to his preferred highest principle and aspiration, or his metaprinciple. However, by the time 558 he was becoming really famous, from 1971 onward, Lee allegedly regretted naming his approach at all, because a name implies an entity, a fixed identity, with a stable form and content, and Lee wanted what he did and what his friends, training partners, and students did to keep evolving. Shortly before his untimely death in 1973, he even told his senior students to stop teaching completely. The jury is still out about exactly why he did this.
The most ungenerous interpretations suggest that Lee did this because he was worried that because of his growing celebrity his students would be exposed as inferior martial artists, something that would inevitably reflect badly on him. Other interpretations refer to the fact that because his film career had taken off he knew he couldn't devote enough time to this part of his life, so he sensibly shut up shop. But another equally viable interpretation relates to his thinking about pedagogy. It is his own senior student, Dan Inosanto, who now regularly reiterates this point: jeet kune do, says Inosanto, is something that can be taught and learned but that cannot be formalized, institutionalized, or standardized. It demands an intimacy that no institution can guarantee. You either get it or you don't. Consequently, Inosanto himself claims that while he teaches a range of martial arts classes to anyone, only select individuals are invited or accepted into his jeet kune do classes. 5 In this, Inosanto continues partially in Lee's footsteps, adopting a kind of synthesis of Lee's approach, for, after initially aspiring to set up a major franchise of martial arts clubs in the United States, Lee ultimately concluded that teaching should be small scale and intimate.
But none of this is radical. Indeed, it bears family resemblances to one of the most traditional of institutions in Chinese martial arts pedagogy: the tradition of the "indoor student." This is a student selected by the master as the one most likely to carry the torch forward and who is therefore given considerably more (and considerably more private and intimate) attention. We might evaluate this tradition in any number of ways. In Deleuzian terms, it is arboreal. In Derridean terms, it is inseminatory rather than disseminatory. In Rancièrean terms, it may be either stultifying or emancipatory. However, what is clear is that it demands intimacy.
ambivalent intimacy
There is an ambivalence in poststructuralism about intimacy. On the one hand, as we see in Derrida's reading of Socrates/Plato (1981), pedagogical intimacy can be phonocentric, metaphysical, dominating, constraining, and so on. But on the other hand, the intimacy implied in the poststructuralist fantasy scenario of a seminar group engaged in a close reading of a difficult modernist literary text is sometimes put on a pedestal and raised to the status of being just about the only kind of authentic revelatory eventthe only one that the first generation of poststructuralists seemed to know about, anyway. Might this fetish or fantasy be something we should unlearn?
In any case, there does not seem to be any of this ambivalence about intimacy in Rancière's work. In The Ignorant Schoolmaster we have illiterate fathers coaching their children in learning to read by making them connect the sound of the words of the Lord's Prayer with the marks on the page, and we witness whole classrooms of students learning all manner of sciences, languages, jurisprudence, and legal argumentation without any formal content being transmitted from the teacher or anyone else to them. All that seems required for ignorant schoolmastery is the alchemy of egalitarian address and a hierarchy of wills. 6 But this type of relation is precisely the one that poststructuralism most seems to worry about. However, poststructuralism appears very comfortable with some other types of intimacy. For instance, it demands extreme intimacy with the textual supplement (specifically with the book). Yet it is much less comfortable with the idea of intimacy with the pedagogue. Rancière's Jacotot repeats this pattern in a way. He demands an intimacy with the text (or other object, riddle or problem), but he also seems to require a definite distance between teacher and student (or between master and autodidact). The ignorant schoolmaster addresses the student as an equal but also exerts his or her will. There is a definite personal interaction, from instruction to encouragement to verification. But there is also an absolute separation between the commander and the commanded. The teaching and the learning both take place autodidactically, without the transfer of signified content from one mind to another.
teaching without teaching
There is a great deal of value in Rancière's treatment of Jacotot's approach. However, if it actually seems radical to anyone, I suspect that this is primarily because they haven't been paying attention to everything outside the text. For, once it is pointed out, we can see precisely such relations everywhere. Just think of the sports coach, the drill sergeant, the sparring partner, the parent, grandparent, or indeed the younger sibling, or one's own students. Each of these in their own way merely demands that the student learn or, as in the case of the grandparent, uncle, aunt, or younger paul bowman 560 sibling, merely marvel out loud about this or that achievement of the child. As a range of studies have shown, "avuncular encouragement," or merely expressing how impressive a child's abilities seem to be, can be all that is required for children to undertake major feats of knowledge or skill acquisition . Doubtless even the Nike slogan "just do it" plays on a loop in countless people's heads as they force themselves to learn how to go further or faster or better. Similarly, I know for certain that the words and movement images of Bruce Lee and other cinematic martial artists from Jackie Chan to Jason Bourne play out in montage behind the eyes of countless students and teachers of martial arts. One of my sparring partners used to quite audibly make film sound effects noises while sparring.
Unlike the martial arts sifu or sensei or master or indeed the university professor, the sports coach does not necessarily embody or equal the highest level of skill in the activity. The sports coach is someone who drives the student on, with carrot or whip, with challenges or praise, with advice and criticism, and so on. But his or her charge does not necessarily learn anything from him or her. Similarly, the drill sergeant, on Freud's view, merely makes the soldiers hate him by being a bastard to them, until they bond together through their shared hatred and then eventually come to love him as the person who made them what they are. Good sparring partners simply present their opponents with problems to be solved: their fist will keep hitting and their foot will keep kicking their opponent, and the opponent will keep ending up on the floor being choked out unless he or she works out how to solve these problems.
The sociologist Loïc Wacquant, who spent three years immersed in the world of boxing in the Chicago ghetto, actually depicts the boxing gym as a habitus production and maintenance machine in which everyone and everything is a teacher: the professional boxers are to be emulated; the novices serve as reminders and yardsticks of development; and when the head coach shouts commands or reprimands at anyone in the gym, like "What are you doing over there?" or "Keep your hands up!," everyone in the gym responds, because even if not directed at them personally, such words are of course universal injunctions in the gym, and therefore they are directed at them personally.
We could go on and come up with different typologies and taxonomies of pedagogical relations and scenes, ignorant schoolmasters and stultifying pedagogues, in different realms and registers. But there's no need to do that. My point is merely that Jacotot's "universal learning" is universal because, well, it is at least very widespread. It is the artifice of the inegalitarian institution that is the anomaly to be questioned. And, again, neither Jacotot nor Rancière are unique in embracing universal learning. Bruce Lee did precisely this in the field of martial arts, as have many others since and as many others surely had before. learning without learning Bruce Lee spawned a movement in martial arts, whose imperatives boil down to an anti-institutionalism, on the one hand, and an intimate experimental and verificationist ethos, on the other. In other words-in its most radical versions-the Bruce Lee message can even be interpreted as don't join a school or club; work it out for yourself (Miller 2000, 56) . This is what Bruce Lee did: he walked away from-actively renounced-martial arts styles. By the late 1960s he was saying that he no longer saw himself as practicing Chinese kung fu at all (Tom 2005, 11) .
But in his renunciation of styles and institutions lies the very problem of Bruce Lee. He never completed the syllabus of the martial art he studied in Hong Kong through his teens (wing chun). He went to America when he was eighteen and soon started teaching. As a young hotshot he made a name for himself, and in a context saturated by militaristically trained and sports-focused Japanese and Korean martial arts, Lee's Chinese kung fu performances stood out as something else. It was in this context, that Lee came to believe that martial arts were in a sorry state. They were, he said, full of strictures, leading to "organized despair" (1971, 27) , that they were stultifying. And so he began to innovate. He maintained the wing chun centerline; he added Korean taekwondo kicks; he adopted the western fencing stance; he emulated the techniques used by the best boxers with the most powerful jabs; he began learning the grappling, infighting and ground fighting of Japanese jujitsu; he explored the weapons styles of the Philippines. And so on.
But was this done in ignorance or knowledgably? Can you really dip into a martial art-one whose practitioners insist it takes years to masterand pull out bits and pieces? Are you really able to evaluate them? Are you even able to perceive them? Certainly, this kind of thing is nowadays easily sent up. In the online comedy mockumentary series "Enter the Dojo," Master Ken has devised his own martial art, called ameri-do-te, whose motto is "the best of all, the worst of none."
The question that is endlessly asked about Bruce Lee is whether his new hybrid form was a real authentic improvement or whether it was just that because he had not actually finished the syllabus in any martial art, he arrogantly concluded there was no martial art that could not be improved (Smith 1999, 346) . There are stories of Bruce Lee returning to see his teachers and classmates in Hong Kong after he had been training away from them in the United States, believing he was progressing on his own. In these stories, we hear that Lee demonstrated how much he had improved. His former teachers and peers, however, believed that he had not improved at all! Indeed, to their mind, how could he improve? He hadn't finished learning the syllabus, and so didn't know what he was missing (Smith 1999, 346) . Accordingly, in this discourse about Bruce Lee, we see (or I see because I have been trained to see) a version of the kind of disagreement Rancière had with Althusser, which is a version of the disagreement Rancière had with Bourdieu. In this rendition, Althusser would be in the position of the old masters. Bruce Lee would be the revolutionary student, rejecting the institution and instituting a new one. The question is whether the view that you have to go through the ranks of the institution before you can know enough to legitimately disagree with the institution or to be in a position to contest it legitimately is logical and reasonable or inegalitarian, hierarchical, and possibly even stultifying. Rancière claims that people like Althusser and Bourdieu implicitly or explicitly held the former position, while he himself seems instead to hold the latter.
In the end, though, our own views on this question matter little. Schools, associations, and styles are instituted, flourish, fragment, and collapse or reform. Agreeing or disagreeing with this state of affairs is like agreeing or disagreeing with the weather. There are heresies and there are factions. There are paradigm shifts and revolutions. There are mutations and transformations; there are translators and traitors. There is also the growing perception that all styles and systems are hybrids and bastards, each typically claiming a pure lineage, a completeness, a plenitude and unitarity that is actually only pure in that it is purely ideological. Consequently, unlike Jacotot's printer's son, we are rarely, if ever, in a position to know with certainty whether our Hebrew is or is not really Hebrew. Your kung fu is not real kung fu; your tai chi is hippy tai chi; my tai chi is real martial tai chi; yours is a bastardized form; mine is the original and best. And so on.
Of course, it is easy now to say that we know that the idea of the original, like the idea of the authentic, is a red herring. So perhaps we can adjudicate in terms of better and worse. And this is the time-honored question of martial arts: which martial art is best? Which martial art works best? Which style would win out? Whether or not Bruce Lee really knew the ins and outs of all the other martial arts, was his own construction objectively better or worse than others? Surely this can be decided. You'd think. Unfortunately, deciding this is like deciding which is the best move in rock-paper-scissors. Evaluating one style against another style is only ever a matter of judging one person against another person in context after context. In other words, it is an interminably undecidable process.
Which is perhaps why Bruce Lee never really engaged in polemics against specific martial arts styles. His problem was with the very idea of style, and specifically with the way styles were taught. Styles stultify, he argued. True learning is not about accumulation but about reduction. You have to get to the essence. Hence, he proposed, his approach (jeet kune do) could be taught and learned but not really institutionalized. It could not be formalized. It demanded an ethos and an intimacy. It was less about formal content and much more about attitude. Teaching and learning should be experimental, alive, moving, hands on, verificationist, one on one. In learning jeet kune do, Lee argued, one is in a sense only relearning-retooling, reorienting, reprogramming, rewiring, rewriting-one's own body. Learning how to "honestly express yourself " is a phrase Lee would often use.
A lot of the inventiveness in the martial arts over the last fifty years has emerged more or less in complete ignorance of classical or formal martial arts disciplines. This antidisciplinarity has of course produced new disciplines: MMA, or mixed martial arts, was-as its name attests-never meant to be one thing. But over time it has become so (kicking, punching, grappling, ground), with recognizable features and forms.
Whence the paradox: the rejection of discipline is not freedom from discipline. All martial arts revolutions, all martial arts paradigms, all martial arts learning, involve retraining one's body or bodily propensities. This can only happen both through and to the extent that what emerges is a discipline. Without the institution of discipline-inherited or inventedyou get nothing. No change, no improvement, no event. The discipline can be adopted (like when you join a club), or it can be invented (like when you devise your own style, techniques, or training regimen). It will always be implicitly or explicitly social or invented from socially circulating materials, discourses, ideas and principles.
Most revolutions in martial arts paradigms and institutions that I am acquainted with have involved the rejection of one discipline and the reciprocal construction of another. Legend has it that Bruce Lee, for example, had a major rethink after ending one challenge match completely exhausted and dejected because he had not won the fight much more quickly and efficiently. Thus, the legend continues, he rejected a lot of the training and techniques specific to the style of kung fu he had hitherto practiced and added weight training, running, and other stamina training, boxing-style training, and a whole range of pad work and bag work. He also began paying closer attention to his diet. Some say he also took performanceenhancing drugs.
However, much of the logic and structure of the wing chun "nucleus" was apparent in his new creation. As Derrida puts it, an institution is not just the four walls that surround us; it is the very structure of our thought. And Bruce Lee's thinking about combat can be said to have remained hegemonized by the structure of wing chun's implicit theory of efficiency in combat.
unlearning discipline
The extent to which Bruce Lee's understanding of combat was hegemonized by his training in wing chun raises an interesting question: can discipline be unlearned? In an obvious sense, yes, of course it can. Lack of practice or improper practice means getting out of practice, getting sloppy, getting it wrong. This is as true of spending time away from training as it is for spending time away from academia as it is for not practicing your foreign language or even not practicing drinking your beer. And so on. Indeed, if we follow certain of the implications in Derrida's argument about the inevitability of dissemination, then the question might perhaps be reposed as one of whether it is ever possible to halt the drift and warps and discursive wending away from discipline. As Adam Frank argues in his ethnographic and genealogical study of tai chi quan in Shanghai, a quick read of the so-called tai chi classics reveals that the art these nineteenth-century texts are discussing is very different-very different indeed-from anything seen in the parks of Shanghai today. This is because the styles have drifted, bifurcated, intermingled, been subject to fashions, fads, government policies, standardizations, the modernization movement in the early twentieth century, Maoism, and so on and so forth, such that any practitioner of any form of tai chi chuan today is literally embodying decades upon decades of writings and rewritings that they cannot but be largely ignorant of. The embodied practice is a material residue of historical layers and all kinds of intervention that are in effect the unconscious of the activity.
On an related tangent, Frank also mentions the problem of the vacuum left in Shanghai's parks after the state crackdown on Falun Gong practice in the 1990s. He notes that in order to fill the spaces where Falun Gong practitioners had previously been, the government actually bussed in hundreds upon hundreds-even thousands-of practitioners of a new "ancient" art, called mulanquan. Now, mulanquan is passed off as ancient, but its first appearance in public was in the wake of both the crackdown on Falun Gong and the global success of the Disney animated film Mulan. Needless to say, surely most of the now myriad practitioners of this sanitized and state-approved form are ignorant of its peculiar emergence. It is only thanks to Adam Frank's publication of knowledge gained on his intimate ethnographic research that I have learned this myself. So can I even be sure that I know it? This may be a version of a Lyotardian "postmodern legitimation crisis in knowledge," but it also sums up a problem for anyone who practices what they may want to believe to be an ancient and timeless Chinese or Japanese art: is this the real thing?
Interestingly, most practitioners of Asian martial arts-Eastern and Western practitioners-have not the faintest idea about or interest in the actual history of the art they practice. They may believe all kinds of things about a lineage stretching back to Bodhidharma or Zhang Sanfeng or the Shaolin Temple. But most martial arts are not allowed to have a history; that is, they tend to be represented as timeless. And this is not necessarily either a problem of orientalism or self-orientalization. Rather, it is a matter of what Derrida called "teleiopoeisis": the crucially important political process of evoking the ancient and unchanging as a proof of the present.
Nevertheless, history moves. Discourses drift. Stabilizations wobble. Fashions jolt. There is no pure repetition in embodied or kinetic or any other kind of mimesis. There is reiteration, which equals the introduction of alterity. This goes on without our noticing. If we noticed it, we would try to halt it. Because our aim is learning, not unlearning.
But, if it were our goal, could discipline be consciously unlearned, deliberately rejected, and with or without a teacher? Can we unlearn the habits of our own lifetime? Can you teach an old dog new tricks? I would propose that learning something new-something truly different-is often likely to involve a reciprocal unlearning. To stay with the example of tai chi: I spent over a decade learning it, after having studied several other martial arts at different times for different lengths of time. The discipline of tai chi demands more or less exactly the opposite of everything I'd ever learned to do before. Learning tai chi involved unlearning so many accumulated habits: the use of resistance, force against force, strength, separation, speed. And I would have to say that I could not have learned this new discipline paul bowman 566 without a teacher. However, the basic teaching was mimetic. (Hands here, feet here. Watch. Copy.) The more advanced teaching was necessarily tactile and hands on. Error was shown by what happened to my body (pain, being pinned in an arm lock or head lock or throw). Correctness revealed itself by my not getting trapped or thrown or by my success in trapping, locking or throwing my partner. The teacher's words were limited to commands, corrections: relax your shoulder; regain your posture; turn from the waist; yield; push.
Unfortunately, this kind of bodily knowledge is all too easily unlearned. It requires such a high degree of proprioceptive sensitivity and control that if you don't use it, you lose it. You can remember it intellectually; you can discuss it in words; but your body loses the ability to know it and do it.
Anthropologists and sociologists speak of bodily knowledge, embodied knowledge, the intelligence of the body. But I don't think they speak of bodily stupidity or the stupidity of the body. Ignorance, perhaps: bodies can be ignorant. Bodies can not-know, can be unaware, or indeed can ignore. But you are unlikely to hear anyone say (other than in jest) "my body is too stupid to do push hands" or "my body is too stupid to do a jumping spinning back kick." And you are unlikely to think you are more intelligent than your training partners if you beat them in any kind of sparring. You are merely likely to have trained harder, longer, or better. Everyone is equal. Anyone can knock anyone else out. One meaning of "kung fu" is disciplined, sustained, and skilled investment of time and effort. Every martial arts teacher knows that the distance between teacher and student can close fast, sometimes in an instant. Indeed, arguably one of the basic reasons to teach students is to bring them up to a level where they can push you, to make you keep up your own discipline.
conclusion: the pedagogics of unlearning
In conclusion, disciplines are invented traditions. The knowledge that disciplines produce is not only disciplinary knowledge but also and perhaps fundamentally knowledge of the discipline. This is as true for academic disciplines as it is for martial disciplines. All have their "reality tests" and modes and manners of verification and self-verification or validation and self-validation. And very often it is possible for even related work in contiguous disciplines to be produced in complete ignorance of the work in the other field. This is not because researchers are lazy or stupid. It is rather that the metaphor for disciplinary work itself-specifically, the word "field" (as in "disciplinary field" or "academic field")-is something of a misnomer. Today, at least, so-called academic fields are really rather more akin to halls of mirrors, in which you can see yourself and other objects reflected back at yourself, in various shapes and sizes, but without really knowing where they are and without being able to see anyone or anything round the corner or reflected away.
Hence my proposal that we might now want to unlearn the argument about pedagogy as a key cog or ideological apparatus in a densely reticulated sociopolitical terrain. The very dominance in vocational-educationalemployment vocabulary of the sacred term "transferrable skills" attests to the fact that education is by and large not immediately connected with anything else anywhere else, without the effort of translation and transformation.
Unlearning disciplinarity may demand what Rancière once called "indiscipline." There is inevitably some debate about what this might mean. Using the field of martial arts once again as my example, I conclude by exploring whether academics might learn anything from the term. My take on the key feature of the most recent revolution in martial arts pedagogyinitiated by Bruce Lee but elaborated much more fully in various directions in his wake-might be summarized like this: martial arts are to be unlearned because we have to concede that the reality that martial arts seek to master is not unified, univocal, predictable, or masterable. It is not the eminently manageable and manipulable space of the dojo, dojang, or kwoon. Instead, what has to be acknowledged is our ignorance of the chaos, unpredictability, and traumatic effects of the irruption of the reality of violence. Probabilities can be played with, predicted, estimated, guesstimated, imagined. But, to echo Paul de Man, every answer to every question in the teaching and learning of martial arts, self-defense or combat skills should really be "perhaps."
The new paradigm of martial arts is based in the perceived need always to interrupt discipline before it settles down as system and settles into the function of, as it were, offering reassurances to children-to borrow a phrase from Derrida. This is exemplified in a spectrum of approaches. On the one hand, there are fighting systems that are based on acknowledging the likelihood of the destruction of most people's training by the chaos and violence of an attack. On the other hand, there are approaches based in psychology, sociology, and certain aspects of biology (specifically around the effects of what some authors call "the chemical dump," or the explosion of often completely incapacitating chemicals within one's body in the event of attack). And so on. What all share is a principled commitment to indiscipline because of the unpredictability of reality and hence the certainty of ignorance-and the power of surprise.
The surprise attack, the surprise of violence-in fact, any surprise-can totally incapacitate anyone. But this is not necessarily negative. Surprises come from everywhere. Here's my final anecdote. When I first began studying tai chi, when my head and heart were filled with mysticism and orientalism and magic, I complained to my tai chi teacher about a steep hill that I could never manage to cycle up without stopping from exhaustion. He said, that's because you are pushing with your legs; pump instead from your "dan tien" (below your belly button), and then you'll get up the hill and do so without becoming tired at all. So, the next day I tried it. Lo and behold, what he said came true. So, when I next saw him I immediately reported, with delight and pride, that it had worked. He said, blimey, so it is true; I've never been able to do anything like that. Can you teach me how to do it?
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